Volume-XII, Special Issue, April 2026 |
মানস প্রত্যক্ষে মনের বহিরিন্দ্রিয়ের নিরপেক্ষতার বিভ্রান্তিঃ ন্যায়দর্শনের আলোকে একটি দার্শনিক পর্যালোচনা সুস্নিগ্ধা নাথ, রাজ্য সরকার অনুমোদিত কলেজ শিক্ষক, শান্তিপুর কলেজ, নদীয়া, পশ্চিমবঙ্গ, ভারত |
Received: 30.03.2026 | Accepted: 07.04.2026 | Published Online: 10.04.2026 | Page No: 30-38 | ||||
DOI: 10.29032/ijhsss.vol.12.issue.specialW.265 | |||||||
The Illusion of Neutrality of External Senses in Mental Perception: A Philosophical Review in the Light of Nyaya Philosophy Susnigdha Nath, SACT, Shantipur College, Nadia, West Bengal, India | ||
ABSTRACT | ||
This paper critically examines the concept of the independence of the mind (manas) from external sense organs in mental perception (mānasa pratyakṣa) within the framework of Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Classical Nyāya posits the mind as an internal organ, atomic, eternal, and distinct, functioning as the necessary mediator between the self and the senses. It is held to be independent in apprehending internal states such as pleasure, pain, desire, and aversion, without requiring the assistance of external sense organs. However, this study problematizes such a claim of complete independence. Through a philosophical and analytical method, drawing upon primary texts like Tarkasaṃgraha, Nyāya Sūtra, and their commentaries, the paper argues that mental perception is not entirely free from the influence of external sensory experience. Even though internal cognition appears immediate, its content is often shaped by prior sensory inputs, memory traces, and experiential impressions derived from the external world. By examining cases such as sensory deprivation, imagination, and memory, it is demonstrated that mental states are indirectly conditioned by external perception. The paper further situates this debate within broader Indian philosophical discussions on the nature of mind across Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, and Buddhist traditions. Ultimately, the study concludes that the Nyāya claim of the mind’s complete independence in mental perception is philosophically untenable, and that a relational model—acknowledging the interdependence of internal and external faculties—offers a more coherent explanation of cognition. | ||
Keywords: Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika, Manas, Mental Perception, External Sense Organs, Indian Philosophy, Cognition |